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Research engagement #5 to Brussels, Belgium

Cathleen Berger, Charlotte Freihse

8. April 2024 – 9. April 2024

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Introduction

Focus: Governance of the digital information ecosystem

In collaboration with GLOBSEC, Upgrade Democracy held its fifth research engagement in Brussels, Belgium, aiming to pinpoint key challenges and lessons for the upcoming EU Commission. With the Digital Services Act (DSA), the EU has made strides in regulating the digital information landscape in line with democratic principles and the rule of law. The crucial question remains: Are EU-level approaches adequate to foster a healthy information ecosystem? The one-day workshop convened a diverse group of around 40 experts including journalists, academics, policymakers, industry, and civil society representatives to evaluate regulatory and non-regulatory approaches to countering disinformation. Under Chatham House rules, participants reflected on next steps and recommendations for the next EU Commission and political priorities.

A summary of our findings, insights, and impressions follows below. The workshop summary is also available in PDF format, downloadable at the bottom of the page.

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The workshop

During this one-day workshop, a diverse, cross-sectoral set of around 40 experts shared their perspectives and insights in four thematic sessions. The overall goal in all of them: Indicate next steps and develop recommendations for the next EU Commission.

The first session was focused on assessing what has changed in the European Union since the 2019 elections – and whether the EU is well prepared to counter disinformation ahead of the EU elections in June 2024. While the Digital Services Act (DSA), the Code of Practice on Disinformation, the AI Act and others were recognised as regulatory milestones, there was hesitancy in the room in terms of implementation, enforcement, and evaluation of impact. Concerns were raised around sustainable funding for civil society organisations; reliable knowledge networks across stakeholders, within sectors, and among organisations; as well as potential gaps in electoral oversight bodies when it comes to AI-generated election content that is not shared through official political advertising channels. In addition, there were calls to be mindful of a Counter-Brussels effect of EU regulation and to expand data access under the DSA to international researchers.

A second session focused on the role of governments in countering disinformation. Participants discussed a typology of various possible state actions, including mitigating false information, establishing new, specialised agencies, supporting public media environments, the governance of digital platforms, and increasing transparency for governmental communication. Building on experiences from Latvia and Sweden, the discussion highlighted that whole-of-society approaches are critical, that counter-disinformation efforts must necessarily span across policy fields and sectors, and that context is crucial for measures to be effective. Lastly, there is a tendency to focus on foreign malign interference, also because it is easier to curb, whereas limiting domestic influence actors must strike a delicate balance and ensure higher standards for protecting free speech.

The third session focused on innovative and established practices in countering disinformation across civil, private, and media sectors. Panelists explored cross-sector collaboration and knowledge sharing, especially in leveraging new technologies. Key points included the need for sustainable collaboration amid mounting challenges, the crucial role of the media sector despite facing various hurdles, and the insufficient transparency of social media platforms’ measures to ensure election integrity.

The final panel discussion focused on recommendations for the upcoming European Commission. Challenges highlighted included navigating the digital transition amid the pandemic and defining disinformation competencies within governmental entities. Emphasizing disinformation’s security implications on democracy, key recommendations included establishing knowledge hubs, adopting a comprehensive approach, and increasing resources to bolster EU’s role in countering disinformation.

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Bilateral on-site meetings

In bilateral meetings with representatives from civil society organisations and governments, several key points emerged:

Data access for research: Concerning systemic risks, it was stressed that further research on metrics will be necessary. There is a concern about how Article 40 under the DSA serves its purpose and how independent researchers can effectively utilise it given their resource constraints. The case of Meta abandoning CrowdTangle is posing challenges for monitoring organisations that relied on it, while new tools exist, training and better insight into possible research designs is needed. This highlights the ongoing challenge of adapting to changes and acquiring new technical capacities with limited resources.
Beyond EU borders: While there is broad support for international research access to platform data as well as acknowledgement of the need to reflect on unintended consequences beyond the EU’s borders, doubts were raised whether such calls can generate enough attention on the political agenda in Brussels at present. There is a sense that the EU is preoccupied with implementing the DSA domestically, making it unlikely to focus much on external matters.
Economy and security: This aligns with the perception that economic and security issues currently dominate and will continue to capture Brussels’ attention in the future. There exists the perception that there is less capacity for addressing long-term strategic topics, leading to a more reactive rather than proactive agenda in Brussels.

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Observations and key takeaways

Perspectives on EU regulation

The EU prides itself as an innovative regulatory power that has established reliable frameworks for consultations with civil society, academia, and industry players. Its regulatory measures often include test and trial periods for specific mandates, such as the obligation of very large online platforms to mitigate systemic risks. These get clarified, evaluated, and redefined through guidelines and reporting mechanisms.
However, when EU regulation spills over to other countries, this usually only happens based on the initial regulation, not the continuous improvement. This creates a Counter-Brussels effect in countries outside the EU, where redress, consultation, and evaluation mechanisms are missing or underdeveloped.

Perspectives on online platforms

Very large online platforms (VLOPs) take EU regulation – and its potential fines, seriously, at least serious enough to ensure a high presence of public policy staff across events, public, and non-public engagements. There is a sense that social media platforms understand that they need to do better.
At the same time, understanding the consequences and exploring the boundaries or exploiting the regulatory wiggle rooms are different things. If there is a way to limit the scope of action, bypass obligations or implement them in a way that hinders oversight, platforms will find it. One critical example is the right to data access for research, which may in theory be available, but is in practice severely lacking.

Perspectives on transparency

The demand for transparency remains unabated over time, despite the establishment of various entities and mechanisms aimed at enhancing transparency in recent years. Ironically, some of these entities dedicated to promoting transparency themselves lack transparency. Consequently, despite advancements, the persisting lack of transparency continues to contribute to power imbalances, particularly concerning information exchange between platforms and other sectors.
Furthermore, it was emphasised that information transparency also encompasses the way information is presented. For example, the transparency reports issued by platforms are often shared as lengthy PDFs, drowning civil society in hard to process information.

Perspectives on civil society resilience

There is widespread agreement on the pivotal role of civil society in countering disinformation, underscoring the need for greater efforts to bolster its capabilities, particularly in terms of financial resources. Whether governments or private entities (social media platforms) should bear the financial burden is debatable, with arguments for both emphasising different strengths and interests.
In addition to that, financial structures that enable building up sustainable organisational structures are considered a key element to ensuring a resilient landscape of civil society organisation in the future.

Perspectives on governments

While there is no question that governments have a role to play in addressing disinformation, it is imperative that this does not outweigh the whole-of-society approach needed in countering disinformation effectively.
Continuous evaluation of potential government roles will be essential to minimise the risk of state actions undermining democratic principles and citizen rights. There is a prevailing notion that indirect strategies to counter disinformation, such as bolstering media pluralism, civil society resilience, and democracy through targeted funding, pose minimal risk of harm.
With a looming Trump re-election scenario, collaboration and partnerships among democratic states of similar mindsets become increasingly pertinent in mitigating disinformation. Prioritising knowledge sharing and cooperation are crucial, alongside fostering a unified vision for strengthening democratic resilience.

Summary

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